Justice and Lawfulness

When one speaks of justice, the first thing that normally comes to mind is punishment, rectification for wrongs, imprisonment, even death in some instances. Such things as pleonexia would not even be considered an injustice by many unless one was to commit a crime in order to fulfill one’s desire for material wealth as they were in the time of Aristotle. In Plato’s Republic, Thrasymachus makes the assertion that people are only just because it is in their best interest to be just. This idea was not uncommon at the time, as Thucydides makes known in his The War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians when the Athenians are addressing the Spartan Assembly:

As for good will from the divine, neither do we suppose that we will fall short. For we are neither claiming as our right nor are we doing anything outside of human belief with regard to the divine or human wish with regard to themselves. For we think, on the basis of opinion, regarding the divine, and on the clear basis of a permanent compulsion of nature, regarding the human, that wherever they have the might, they rule. And we neither laid down the law nor are we the first to have used it as laid down, but we received it in existence and we will leave it behind us in existence forever; and we use it in the knowledge that both you and others, if you came to have the same power as we have, would do it too (Strauss 14).

This justification for the Athenians attack on the Peloponnesians was used in order to try to dissuade the Spartans from intervening in the war that the Athenians had begun. A common belief of the time was that justice is of no account in human matters unless it was forced upon one party by another of equal power—justice was whatever the strong believed it was (Strauss 14).

Now it is clear that in the hundred or so years between Thucydides and Aristotle that the philosophy had begun to change with regard to justice among the learned, but, at least during Plato’s time, the idea still held strong among some of the people, and it is reasonable to infer that it held in Aristotle’s as well. Even in modern times this assertion has been made by states; Nazi Germany comes to mind as an extreme example and, some would argue, the United States as a much more benign case (relatively speaking). Both of these countries have used their military might to oppress others through actual force and legislative action.

Taking this into account, it is interesting that Aristotle makes the assumption that all laws are inherently just when he makes the claim that lawlessness is equivalent to injustice (Westphal 74). Aristotle makes a habit of making assertions and then assuming that the same can be said about the opposite, “…the lawless person and the greedy and unfair person seem to be unjust; and so…the lawful and the fair person will be just” (Westphal 74). Would it not be just to break an unjust law? By virtue of the fact that those in control are in control, they are seen by Aristotle to be virtuous. This would lead one to believe that, since those in power made laws, whatever laws they enact are inherently just by virtue of the fact that those who created them are virtuous. This would mean that both Nazi Germany and the United States were justified in their actions. Even the suggestion of this is completely abhorrent and clearly points out a flaw in the logic of the divine right of rulers, which was a widely held belief at the time. Therefore it cannot be asserted that by virtue of the fact that one is lawful that one is also just as Aristotle does under “General Justice”.

Works Cited

Strauss, Leo, and Joseph Cropsey. "Thucydides." History of Political Philosophy. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972. 14. Print.

Westphal, Jonathan. "Plato." Justice. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub., 1996. 37-72. Print.