The Erring Ruler

Throughout Book I of the Republic, Socrates and Thrasymachus ponder and debate the meaning of justice. Thrasymachus is convinced that justice is doing what is to the advantage of the stronger, and he is quite persistent in this belief. In an attempt to disprove him, Socrates makes an example out of those with ruling power. As rulers are clearly the stronger people in their societies, it is apparent that Thrasymachus' definition of justice would require the citizenry to do what is to their ruler's advantage. Thus, whatever laws he chose to instate should be followed.

However, Socrates points out that rulers too are prone to make mistakes, and that there would inevitably be laws that actually disadvantage the ruler. Following Thrasymachus' logic, the citizens should instead disobey these disadvantageous laws, in order to still benefit the ruler. Of course, that would entail disobedience of the stronger, which would be unjust. All of this leads Socrates to the conclusion that Thrasymachus' definition of justice does not hold, as it leads to a contradiction of itself (41).

Thrasymachus, indignant, attempts to unearth a loophole in Socrates' argument. He declares that, in a moment of error, a ruler can no longer be considered a ruler, as he is no longer properly fulfilling his title. Therefore, Thrasymachus claims that his definition of justice still holds, since a ruler is only a ruler when he is enacting laws that are advantageous to him (42). While Socrates seems to accept this argument, I find it to be unsubstantiated: a ruler does not lose his title simply because he errs to his own disadvantage. No matter the craft, error is a normal and expected side-effect; doctors that make incorrect diagnoses are not suddenly stripped of their degrees, rather they learn from their mistakes and continue to practice. If this were not the case, there would surely no longer be any professionals in the world, as they would all have lost their right to name themselves as such.

In fact, I believe that to no longer consider an erring ruler as a ruler is simply providing him with an "out." People should always be held accountable for their mistakes, especially when they affect a mass of people. A ruler that makes such mistakes is still a ruler, though perhaps a poor one. If he passes laws that don't happen to benefit him or that lead citizens to disobey, it is his own fault.

In this line of thinking, Socrates' original contention with Thrasymachus' definition of justice still holds water. The inevitable contradiction is once again present, and Thrasymachus, yet again, seems to be incorrect.